The Afghan Papers by Michael Clarke

Author:Michael Clarke [Clarke, Michael]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780415525930
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2012-06-22T00:00:00+00:00

Notes

1 Witness statement by Tim Cross to the Chilcot Inquiry, 7 December 2009.

2 Author interview with government officials, October 2011. See also James Fergusson, A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan (London: Corgi Books, 2008), p. 217.

3 Richard Teuten and Daniel Korski, Preparing for Peace: Britain’s Contribution and Capabilities, Whitehall Paper 74 (London: Routledge/RUSI, 2010), p. 35.

4 Author interviews with former MoD officials (September 2011) and current DfID official (October 2011).

5 Daniel Korski, ‘British Civil-Military Integration: History and Next Steps’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 154, No. 6, December 2009), p. 16.

6 Author interviews with DfID and MoD officials, October 2011.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 House of Commons Defence Committee [HCDC], The Comprehensive Approach: The Point of War is not Just to Win but to Make a Better Peace, Seventh Report of Session 2009–10, HC 224 (London: The Stationery Office, March 2010), p. 27.

11 Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, ‘COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 154, No. 3, June 2009), p. 24.

12 Author interview with DfID official, October 2011.

13 See James Fergusson, op. cit., p. 208 and Thomas Schweich, ‘Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?’, New York Times, 27 July 2008.

14 Evidence by Ed Butler to the HCDC, Operations in Afghanistan, Fourth Report of Session 2010 12, HC 554 (London: The Stationery Office, July 2011), Ev. 103.

15 James Fergusson, op. cit., p. 230.

16 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, Eighth Report of Session 2008–09 (London: The Stationery Office, July 2009), p. 85.

17 Stuart Gordon, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province’, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April 2011, p. 31.

18 The number of civilians was in fact in double figures.

19 Evidence by Peter Wall to the HCDC, Operations in Afghanistan, op. cit., Ev. 144.

20 Deborah Haynes, ‘They Went into Helmand with Eyes Shut and Fingers Crossed’, The Times, 9 June 2010.

21 Evidence by Richard Reid to the HCDC, Operations in Afghanistan, op. cit., Ev. 96.

22 Evidence by Robert Fry to the HCDC, Operations in Afghanistan, op. cit., Ev. 96.

23 Evidence by Ed Butler to the HCDC, Operations in Afghanistan, op. cit.,Ev. 105.

24 Ibid.

25 It is worth pointing out that the Preliminary Operation Team wanted to conduct more granular planning but there was not sufficient appetite for this in Whitehall at the time.

26 Haynes, op. cit.

27 Author interview with former MoD official, October 2011.

28 Evidence by Ed Butler to the HCDC, The Comprehensive Approach, op. cit., Ev. 15.

29 Author interview with DfID official, October 2011.

30 Author interview with former MoD official, September 2011.

31 Fergusson, op. cit., p. 251.

32 Evidence by Ed Butler to the HCDC, Operations in Afghanistan, op. cit.,Ev. 107.

33 Fergusson, op. cit., p. 241.

34 The view inside DfID is that the plan itself was not allowed to go into the level of detail that would have been necessary to address logistical issues.

35 ‘Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan’, op. cit., p. 85.

36 Haynes, op. cit.

37 Farrell and Gordon, op. cit., p. 20.

38 Evidence by Robert Fry to the HCDC, Operations in Afghanistan, op.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.